In this paper we analyze whether it is true that a families, and especially those with children, would benefit more from a tax system defined with a family rather than an individual tax unit. This analysis is performed using TABEITA04, the tax-benefit microsimulation model developed at Econpubblica on 2004 data. Results show that households with kids would, on average, lose from such a reform as they are better off with an individual tax system which provides generous tax credits for family burdens. The simulated reform would also be extremely costly in terms of labour force participation of spouses: in our sample, over 80% of spouses in our fiscally defined families are not working and nearly 40% would face an increased marginal tax rate if the family tax unit was introduced. Those benefiting the most would be couples without children where both spouses are working, who are not enjoying any tax credit in the current tax system. JEL codes: C15, C81, H24,
Introduction
Italian income taxation is based on an individual tax unit. However, a never ending debate occasionally comes out regarding whether Italian income taxation should move towards a system where family income is considered instead of personal income. In very general terms, those supporting such a change suggest that it would be an effective way to provide a more convenient tax treatment to families. On the other hand, opposers point out the fact that a family taxation would increase the marginal tax rate of the second earner (typically the wife) hence providing a disincentive effects to labour force participation. This second drawbacks is considered particularly serious as total female labour force participation is rather low, even for European standards (for instance, see OECD, 2004) .
In this paper we analyze whether it is true that a families, and especially those with children, would benefit more from a tax system defined with a family rather than an individual tax unit. This analysis is performed using TABEITA04, the tax-benefit microsimulation model developed at Econpubblica on 2004 data. Although TABEITA04 is not a behavioural model and it does not provide estimates of elasticity of labour supply to changes in due tax, it can also provide some hints on the number of people who would face an increase in marginal tax rates if Italian personal income taxation was replaced by a family unit taxation system. The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we briefly describe the 2004 Italian personal income tax (IRPEF) and in Section 3 we analyze the 2004 Survey of Household Income and Wealth, which is typically used for microsimulation modelling.
Section 4 describes the structure of TABEITA04 and how the limitations of the data have been tackled and solved. Section 5 presents the simulation exercise where we used introduced a family tax unit system analogous to the French quotient familial to replace the tax credits for family burdens of the IRPEF, both with constant tax structure and constant tax burdens. Section 6 concludes.
The Italian personal income tax (IRPEF)
In this paper we focus only on the Italian personal income tax (IRPEF), which accounts for over 71% of all direct taxation current receipts in 2004. The tax base of IRPEF is personal income, which includes employment and self-employment earnings, pension, building, real estates, and capital income.
The tax is personal as taxpayers are allowed to claim tax allowances (or deductions) and tax credits, which depend on the personal characteristics of the single taxpayer and his family. Among tax allowances, the most relevant one is the so-called ""no-tax area" tax allowance, which reduces taxable income depending on the type of income earned (typically it is more generous for employment than for self-employment income) and preserve the progressivity of taxation by decreasing with taxable income. Others tax allowances include the deduction for home owners, voluntary deductions for pension funds, contributions to non-governamental organizations and others. Taxable income is net of social contribution, which are either not included in wages or deductible in case of self-employment workers. Self-employment workers are also allowed to partly deduct the cost of income production, such as travel expenses, office rents, etc.
IRPEF gross tax is progressive as it comes from the application of a progressive income bracket structure where bottom taxable incomes have a marginal tax rates equal to 23% and top incomes are taxed at 45% (see Table SAW below). However, not all incomes enter the tax base of the progressive tax schedule. Some others, such as the severance payments and capital gains from financial assets are taxed with a flat and low tax rate (in 2004 the tax rate on capital gains was at 12.5%).
The peculiarity of IRPEF with respect to personal income taxes of other countries is that the tax unit is the individual taxpayer, not the family. However, this does not mean that the family characteristics are not taken into account. IRPEF allows taxpayers to reduce their due tax by tax credits in case they have some relative family burdens, i.e. dependent relatives. Tax credits for family burdens can significantly reduce the due tax, especially at low levels of gross incomes. The main limitations of IRPEF tax credits is that they do not give rise to negative income (i.e. a subsidy) but at most reduce taxable income to zero. Some additional features of the tax system are provided in the Appendix.
The data set for microsimulaton on Italian data
The data set described and used in this paper runs on the 2004 Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) data, which collect information on disposable income, consumption, labour market, monetary and financial variables for 20,581 individuals, belonging to 8,012 households. Out of the total sample of people interviewed, 13,341 are income recipients. As the income data recorded refer to disposable income, excluding taxes and social contributions, and as the SHIW is the only data set for taxbenefit analysis at the national level, the first role of any Italian tax-benefit microsimulation model (MSM) is to simulate the before-tax income.
A MSM on SHIW data can be described as a as a deterministic transformation of a given sample into a new one. More precisely, it may described as a two steps transformation. The first step deals with the cleaning and adaptation of the original SHIW sample into a sample of after tax incomes (AT) to be fed into a microsimulation model. The second step is the simulation of before-tax (BT) income starting from the AT income vector. This distinction is useful when one considers that the SHIW survey is not primarily collected for microsimulation models. The information collected has to be compared to the information that is required to estimate the effect of the tax legislation on a particular individual's income.
Unfortunately, although rich and the best in terms of population representativeness and statistical reliability among all available data set collecting income data, from the point of view of MSM building, SHIW data are sometimes incomplete, sometimes aggregated at the family level and sometimes completely missing. For instance, although SHIW earnings data are generally considered to be less affected by underreporting (such as for tax evasion) than those declared to the tax authorities, SHIW data are still underreporting real and financial wealth, partly also for involuntary reasons as many interviewed people have a very vague idea of the value of their real and financial wealth (see Bank of Italy, 2006) .
The first task at hand is then to produce a dataset of variables at the personal level, as the personal income tax in Italy is based on an individual tax unit. This task involves some work to classify SHIW data into aggregates that are meaningful from a fiscal perspective, such as income from employment, self-employment income or taxable and exempt incomes. Building and real estate wealth is reported by householders at the market price value, while only cadastral rent enters the personal income tax base.
Moreover some family characteristics that are relevant for the determination of the personal income tax aren't surveyed at all: the presence of a disabled child is not surveyed, nor are surveyed particular expenses that allow one to claim tax credits or tax allowances (such as medical expenses, donations to charitable institutions, political parties or foundations, medical and assistance expenses incurred by handicapped persons). In order to overcome this limitation the dataset has to be integrated with some external data to produce estimates of some non surveyed data. In particular, in the MSM model described in the next section, data from the analysis of IRPEF tax forms provided by the Italian Ministry of Finance are used (Ministry of Finance, 2006) .
In other cases data that enters the tax base at the personal level is surveyed at the family level and has then to be attributed to each individual according to some arbitrary rule.
For instance, data about individual income from the participation in a family run business are collected at the family level but no information about shares in the business is provided. We solve this problem by attributing income from family run business to each family member in proportion to the time he worked for it.
Another important issue with microsimulation modelling is the analysis of the sample weights. The vector of individuals weight used to project the sample into the overall population plays a very important role in the MSM final validation. The SHIW sample design is stratified in two steps and to partially correct some sample bias an ex-post stratification was conducted to correct weights and reconstruct the population distribution by age, gender, location of households and size of the municipality of residence (Banca d'Italia, 2006) . The issue of grossing-up weights is relevant especially when simulation are projected to the whole population. The basic problem a static microsimulation model has to tackle is the conversion of net incomes to gross amounts. Theoretically the problem is then reduced to the inversion of the tax function and of all the relevant tax-allowance and tax-credit functions. In practice, since tax allowances and tax credits functions depend on the taxpayer's family income structure (fiscal dependency is defined in terms of gross income being below a determined threshold), one should find a closed form solution with respect to the gross income of all the family members. Since finding such a closed form solution is hardly feasible one has to resort to a mixed approach relying on the analytical inversion of the tax function, taking as given the family income structure. The operation can be described as follows. Let 
holds simultaneously for every j=1,...,n Since finding close form solution for the vector of family incomes yg* is not analytically possible, one has to use numerical approximation.
In order to solve the system we approached the problem in two steps. In the first step
given an estimate of each taxpayer's gross income we calculated tax benefit and tax allowances for the tax payer and for all the household members. The resulting tax benefits and tax allowances are then fed, together with the single taxpayer AT income, in the inverse tax function to get a second estimate of the BT gross income. This was then used to estimate a new level of tax benefits and allowances and the process repeated until a stable solution was achieved.
Taking tax credits and allowances as given the tax function become easily invertible.
The inverse tax function calculates the gross (BT) income from the observed level of AT income given the amount of theoretical tax credit and allowance the individual is entitled to.
The specification of inverted tax function is the following:
1) A starting value:
where yn is the observed value of the net income of the individual and A is the amount of tax credits.
2) An iteration mechanism for all the income tax brackets 
In this case a further complication arises from the fact that the SHIW dataset mixes pre tax and post tax incomes. In fact while generally incomes are surveyed at their after tax level, the income from land and from buildings has to be reconstructed from SHIW data at the gross level (cadastral rent). This means that when inverting the tax function rent related income has to be treated differently from other classes of income reported at their after-tax levels. In the framework outlined above net income is augmented by the net tax. Gross incomes (such as rents) cannot be augmented in that way since it already includes taxes. However, rents enter the tax base and influence the average tax rate. In order to keep the two income type separated gross income is treated in the model as a negative allowance, it contributes to the determination of the marginal tax rate but it doesn't generate any additional income to pay for its taxes, since the latter are already included in its starting level.
As stated above once we take as given the amount of tax allowances and tax benefit the problem of calculating the gross income from the net income is straightforward. What makes the whole process of gross income estimation from SHIW data complex is the interdependence in individual gross income within the family. Since the family is fiscally interdependent, via the tax system of tax credits which are dependent on gross income, the gross income estimation problem has to be solved simultaneously for all the family members.
This means that one needs to solve a system of non linear equations in the form stated in equation (1). To solve such systems one may use different methods, one of the easiest to implement is called the fixed point method (for a complete survey of iterative methods for non-linear system see Conte and de Boor, 1980 and Oliver and Shakiban, 2007) .
In general to solve a system in the form ( ) 0 f x = , one needs to identify a function in the from ( ) The iteration algorithm is then specified as for j=1,…,n and i=1,2,3,… After each iteration an error function is evaluated as:
( 1) ji ji j i yg yg
The system is iterated until an exit condition is met is the form of
Under conditions of regularity of the iteration function, the convergence of the iteration function towards a fixed point is a sufficient condition for the fixed point to be a solution to the original equation.
When such a value is found it is called a fixed point equilibrium for the system. Fixed points can be divided in three classes
• Asymptotically stable when all the nearby solution converge towards it
• Stable when all the nearby solutions converge towards the fixed point
• Unstable when most of the nearby solutions diverge away from the fixed point, and the only stable solution around the fixed-point is the fixed point itself.
In general the fixed point iteration method applied to the tax inversion problem may generate all types of fixed points. The behaviour of the system is governed by the value of the first derivative of the inverse tax function: when the absolute of the first derivative evaluated at the fixed point is less than one then the fixed point is asymptotically stable otherwise the fixed point is unstable.
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When this situation occurs the system has multiple solutions and we do not have any way to discriminate since all of them will satisfy the basic identity.TABEITA04 deals with the existence of multiple solution with a sub algorithm that identifies orbits. Once an orbit is identified the relevant error function is modified to adapt the error definition 2 In general fixed points are stable, with the notable exceptions of some cases in which steps in the tax allowances or tax credits structures, coupled with the interdependence of gross incomes within the household, generates orbits. A orbit is a situation in which the iteration function jumps between multiple solutions without ever converging to a specific one. When the system falls into an orbit the the convergence condition are satisfied every k iterations, so that examining the process of the iteration function we find that:
to the existence of the orbit. It is important to state that when an orbit exist there is no way to tell, from the available information, which of the multiple equilibria is the right one. Since all of them satisfy the basic identity, all are solutions to the gross income estimation problem.
Multiple solutions occur when the actual value of the gross income falls very close to thresholds of non continuous tax credit or tax allowances functions and the same level of net income is compatible with two different levels of gross income resulting from the attribution of two different value of a tax credit, or again within a family when the distribution of observable net incomes is compatible with more than one benefit sharing scheme between the parents. 1) An arbitrary starting point is chosen as the first estimate of gross income for each individual. 2) Given the vector of estimated gross income for the individuals belonging to each family the family income structure is analyzed to identify fiscal dependencies within the family (dependent children, dependent spouse and other relatives). 3) Income dependent tax credits and allowances are calculated for each individual depending from the family structure. 4) For each family a benefit sharing scheme is calculated to ensure that all the tax credits that are freely transferable between members of the family are allocated to taxpayers in the families so that overall tax burden is minimized. 5) Transferable tax benefit are allocated to individuals according to the sharing scheme defined before. 6) The "No Tax Area" allowance is determined taking into account each individual overall income, income type and other tax allowances. 7) The full profile of tax credits s and tax allowances is calculated for each individual 8) The gross and net tax debt are calculated for each individual 9) The estimate for each individual gross income is calculated by adding the net tax debt to the net income. 10) An exit condition is evaluated in the form of a threshold for the difference between the gross income estimated in the current iteration an the gross income estimated in the previous iteration. The algorithm is iterated replacing the starting value of iteration j with the end value of iteration j-1 until the exit condition is verified. In this section we try to answer two main questions: (a) is it true that families would benefit more (i.e. pay less taxes) if the tax unit was the family rather than the individual? (b) How would the marginal tax rate change for the second earner if family instead than the individual tax unit was used?
By using TABEITA04, we answer these questions simulating alternative tax rule scenarios. Instead of defining our own family tax system, we considered the French tax system as a benchmark, and developed our simulations accordingly. The French tax system differs from other family income tax systems, such as the US and the German ones as it is not an exact splitting of a couple total income, but is based on the definition of a family dimension (quotient familial, henceforth QF).
The French splitting method is used to take into consideration the dependants and to lessen the impact of tax progressiveness by applying the progressive tax rate to a definition of income per parts. The method consists in dividing the taxable income of the tax household by the QF (which is equal to one for a single person, to two for a married couple, an additional half for each of the first two dependent children and an additional part for each dependent child thereafter), obtaining a taxable income per parts or equivalent taxable income. Then, the progressive tax bracket tax system is applied to the taxable income and, by multiplying the result by QF, the final due gross tax is obtained. The final due net tax, i t of a generic family i in the population is obtained as:
where A is tax deduction, which reduces the taxable income, D is the tax credit reducing the due tax, ( ) T i is the tax bracket system and
is the sum of taxable incomes of all family members.
Unfortunately, the QF is not the only difference of the Italian and the French tax systems: non-taxable incomes, tax deductions, tax credits, and tax bracket structure differ as there is no coordination at all between Italy and France as far as personal income taxation is concerned. These differences often have very important effects on The fiscal family is made of the parents, the dependent children and other dependent relatives. To be considered a dependent person, according to the 2004 French tax system one has to have an income below a given threshold. In our simulation we set the threshold of € 2,840.51, which is the one used in Italy for defining a dependent relative.
The fiscal family is then different from a biological family as children and other relatives are considered fiscally independent if they have an income over the threshold.
Hence, the number of families of the SHIW sample is smaller than the number of fiscal families. In particular in the 2004 data set, there are 8,012 families and 10,144 fiscal families as defined above.
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The QF parameter are set as in the French system. The French tax bracket structure is as in There is another important issue involved in our, as well as in similar tax simulation exercises: if different tax units and tax systems are considered, the total tax revenue might change. We analyze what happens to the family due tax both in the case of constant tax structure and of constant total tax revenue. 3 Althogh we refer to families, the SHIW data set only records households, i.e. a group of people sharing the same dwelling. As it is impossible to recover the family as distinguished from the household, given the information provided, we ignore the difference between family and household, as it is common practice when using SHIW dataset.
Constant tax revenue is achieved by increasing each marginal tax rate by a constant amount. Some other simulations might have been developed, such as those modifying the income brackets of the tax rule or those changing the number of tax brackets. Some other were explicitly ruled out. In particular, a constant tax revenue achieved by increasing tax rates proportionally was not performed as it would significantly increase the top tax rate and we feel it would be politically unfeasible. In all simulations presented, whenever QF system is used, the 2004 IRPEF tax credits for family burdens have been removed. Other tax credits and tax deductions are left in place and summed up among the members of the same fiscal family. Table 2 presents the amount gained or lost on average by couples and singles, with and without children and by income classes, if the Italian tax system for incomes earned in 2004 was replaced by a QF system. In Table X1 tax revenue is hold constant. In the first part of the table, the tax bracket system is the Italian one, in the second part it is the French one. Looking at the first part of the table, it clearly emerges that those benefiting the most are high income families, as they can greatly reduce their average tax rate when incomes are not evenly earned in the family. Interestingly, couples without children benefit more than couples with children, especially for family incomes below €50,000. Singles with children would also be net losers when their family income is below €30,000. In other words, for families with children and low income it would clearly be preferable to keep the individual tax unit system with 2004 tax credits for family burdens than moving to a family tax unit system similar to that in place in France. A different picture emerges from the bottom panel of Table X1 , where the Italian is replaced with the French tax bracket system. As the latter is more progressive than the former, if Italy adopted the French tax system as well as the French definition of tax unit, low income families would benefit. However, it should also be noted that on average couples without children would benefit more than families with kids. In fact, couple without children would benefit for the reduction of tax rates for income splitting caused by the QF, while in the actual system they cannot claim tax credits for dependent children nor tax credit for dependent spouse, if both spouses have an income over € 2,840.51. Notes: Number represents the average difference between the actual Italian personal income taxation and alternative scenarios, by family. Income is total family income. Scenario "QF Italy" means that French family splitting have been introduced in place of Family tax allowances, with Italian tax bracket structure and holding tax revenues constant. Scenario "QF France" means that French family splitting have been introduced in place of Family tax allowances, with French tax bracket structure and holding tax revenues constant. Table 2 : Gainers and losers with respect to personal income taxation, by family type, and income class.
Although absolute changes are relevant, they do not necessarily reflect the change in standard of livings, as larger families may enjoy some economies of scale, such as for rent and heating. Typically living standards are evaluated looking at equivalent incomes, by dividing the household income by an equivalence scale. The equivalence scale used in this paper is the QF coefficient, i.e. the equivalence scale assumed by the French fiscal authorities.
By using nonparametric regression, we estimate the relationship between equivalent AT and BT income to assess the average effect of the simulations at different level of BT income. Figure 2 shows another relevant feature of the effect of introducing the QF in the Italian taxation: had the family tax unit been used to replace the individual tax unit in the Italian income tax system, the change of average equivalent AT income would have been negligible on average, regardless of the BT income. The tax rate adjustment for holding the total tax revenue constant would also be limited: the tax rates had to be increase only by 5%. Instead, had the QF been introduced together with the French tax bracket system, the equivalent AT income would have been higher but the tax revenue would have been much smaller. To keep the tax revenue constant, each tax rate had to be increased by 13% with a bottom rate of 13% and a top tax rate of 61%. Also the density of equivalent AT income would change. The QF, with French tax brackets and constant tax revenues would reduce the density at low income levels and increase that at equivalent after-tax income around €15,000 (Figure 3) . (Kakwani, 1977; Lambert, 1993) .
The redistributive effect looks at the shift from BT to AT income. With no reranking, the after-tax Lorenz curve coincides with the after-tax income concentration curve. The
Reynolds-Smolensky index (RS) is equal to the difference between the Gini coefficient of before-tax income ( y G ) and the concentration coefficient of after-tax income ( y t C − ) (Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977) . In absence of reranking it is the reduction of the Gini coefficient achieved by the tax. It is also equal to the product of a progressivity index (e.g. t K ) and the average tax on net income ( /(1 ) t t − ):
Hence the redistributive effect is determined by disproportionality and tax incidence. As Table DWA shows, progressivity increases if the French tax bracket system is used.
Redistribution according to the Reynolds-Smolensky index is not much larger if the
French case is considered (Table 3) . A tax system with family tax unit, such as the French system based on the QF, clearly reduces the incentives to enter the labour market if one is the second earner in the couple, as with a family tax unit the entering marginal tax rate is typically higher than with an individual tax unit. For estimating the effect on labour force participation of second earners of a switch to a family tax system, one would need a behavioural MSM.
Although TABEITA is only a static MSM and it cannot provide any elasticity estimation of second earner's labour supply, it can still be used to have an idea of how relevant is this problem and what proportion of the population would be affected. In Table 5 it is shown that 5,192 out of 10,144 families are made of couples, from a fiscal point of view. Hence, the disincentive effects of family tax systems would be relevant for more than 50% of families, where a great majority of second earners (see Table 4 ) did not enter the labour market even with an individual unit tax system. A switch to a family unit tax system would certainly not improve the situation. Table 6 shows in which bracket falls the income of second earners if individual tax unit is used and where it would fall if family tax unit was used instead. It shows that 71% of second earners who have zero tax rate with actual Italian tax system would certainly start from a positive taxable income and face a 23% marginal tax rate if the QF was used instead.
Also some of the second earners who already are working would face a higher marginal tax rate. For instance, 10% of those taxed at a 23% marginal tax rate would fall in the third tax bracket with tax rate equal to 29% if the QF system was introduced. Looking at frequencies along and over the main diagonal, although 57% of second earners would face no change in their marginal tax rate, 38% of them would experience an increased tax burden. even lose from such a reform as they are better off with an individual tax system which provides generous tax credits for family burdens. The simulated reform would also be extremely costly in terms of labour force participation of spouses. In our sample, over 80% of spouses in our fiscally defined families are not working and nearly 40% would face an increased marginal tax rate if the family tax unit was introduced. Those benefiting the most would be couples without children where both spouses are working, who are not enjoying any tax credit in the current tax system. Supporters of family tax unit for income taxation should be aware of these results.
Appendix: Some details of the IRPEF structure
Standard tax allowances
In general real estate and building income derived enter the tax base at a conventional value, the "cadastral value". The cadastral value is the value attributed to land and buildings by the cadastre office on a conventional basis taking into account factors such as the surface area, the location and the quality of the building. In case the real estate or building is not rented, a virtual income is charged to the taxpayer (cadastral rent), based on the estimated cadastral value, which is often much lower than the market value.
However, home owners are entitled to fully deduct the cadastral value of their home from their tax base, regardless of their income and the value of their home.
Other standard tax allowances include compulsory and voluntary social security contributions, up to a certain amount, periodical benefits allowed to the spouse as decided by judicial authority, charitable donations to certain religious institutions and non-governamental organizations, medical and assistance expenses incurred by handicapped persons.
The no-tax area tax allowance
The no-tax area tax allowance was introduced in 2003 to preserve the progressive nature of the tax system after a fiscal reform that raised the first marginal tax rate from 19% to 23%, and erased tax credits that until the previous year were granted for employment, The "no-tax area" tax allowance.
For taxpayers with more than one type of income the most favourable deduction is applied and for employees and pensioners the deduction is assigned pro-quota in function of the days of work/pension in the year. The mechanism work as a tax shields for income below the threshold (total maximum deduction) defined as the sum of the general deduction (column (a) of Table 7 ) and the extra deduction (column (b)), which is income specific. For instance, a pensioner with an income below €7,000 does not have to pay any tax. When the income level is above the total maximum deduction level ( j A ), the no-tax area tax allowance of individual j is determined as:
(€26, 000 ) €26, 000
where is j yi is taxable income, which is equal to gross income minus standard tax allowances.
Tax credits
Gross tax income is obtained applying the progressive tax bracket schedule as in Table   SAW . Net tax is finally obtained reducing the gross tax by the amount of tax credits.
Most important tax credits are those for family burdens, which include dependent spouse, children and other relatives. From a fiscal standpoint a dependent relative is any relative who received an income lower than €2.840,51 throughout 2004. Typically a relative person is the spouse and children. Standard tax credits are generally determined depending on the tax payer gross income and to some other specific characteristics of the household. For instance, tax credits vary according to the number of children (Table   8) . A taxpayer is entitled to full children tax credits if the spouse is dependent, otherwise it can be freely shared by parents The family tax credits then augmented by € 123,95 for every child under the age of 3, while disabled children give the tax payer entitlement to a detraction amounting to €774.69 regardless of income level. For single parent taxpayers are allowed to claim for the first child the same tax credit allowed for a dependent spouse, which is more generous (Table 9 ). Other dependent relatives tax credit are lower in amount and also dependent on the taxpayer's gross income (Table   10 ). Finally, all taxpayers are allowed to deduct from gross tax 19% of some expenditures, including a capped amount of mortgage loan interest, medical expenses exceeding € 129.11, payments to insurance funds up to € 1,291.14, expenses to for secondary and university education of taxpayers and dependent relatives, funeral charges up to € 1,549.37, expenses for disabled persons, donations
